by Thomas Scarborough
Social psychologist Peter Weinreich wrote that one’s identity is ‘the totality of one's self-construal’. To put it in the simplest philosophical terms, it is about the way that individuals relate things to things. Therefore, identity is ordinary. It lies neither in great things, nor in special characteristics, but in all the detail of my daily existence.
In former times, the subject of identity was not much considered. A hundred years ago, the very concept ‘identity’ was virtually unknown. The reason for this is simple. In former times there was, by and large, no other race, no other religion, no other language, no other role to play. Further, there was little choice in the matter. The very survival of the family, and of the larger clan and society, often depended on fairly fixed identities.
Today, this has changed. A global mix of cultures has driven the diversification, even proliferation of identities, while at the same time, economic and social necessity has retreated.
An obvious question now arises: what should we do with identities? More than that, what should we do with conflicts of identity?
As things stand, we have set ourselves up for serious conflict. On the one hand, we have embraced social pluralism which, according to philosophy professor Calvin Schrag, may be described as ‘diversity rather than homogeneity, multiplicity rather than unity, difference rather than sameness’. On the other hand, we have adopted the doctrine of absolute rights, which in the words of philosophy professor Carl Wellman, ‘always hold, that is, disadvantage some second party, within their scope’.
Such pluralism, writes the sociologist Ronald Fletcher, makes 'the problem of preserving order and freedom very great'. On our current views, we set ourselves up for interminable wrangling and conflict.
Within the limited space which is afforded to me here, I propose an alternative to our present, call it ‘trench warfare’.
On the one hand, we must reject the levelling of identities—if that was ever possible. This, on the basis that identity is about the way that individuals relate things to things. It is about the arrangement of the world in our minds—therefore identity represents a kind of virtue ethics. It comes from within. We reject, too, the policing of norms by the state, since authoritarianism skews the way in which things are naturally ordered, and so can prove perilous. Nor can groups or institutions, of course, compete with the state.
This has the following corollaries.
- A citizen, as a citizen, has the right to their identity, and the right to protection from abuse. Such ideas are familiar to us today.
- An identity-bearer, as an identity-bearer, has the right not to be involved in another person’s identity, or to have their own identity transgressed. This differs from the present status quo, which regularly penalises or disadvantages some second party.
- Beyond this—apart from this—the state applies principles which transcend identity, and provide a sense of security to all identities. Within reason, of course.*
This is 'problematic', writes Oxford researcher Alberto Giubilini—namely the 'freedom to act, or to refrain from acting'. He advances, as examples, the refusal of military service or the denial of medical procedures—conversely, the compulsion which brings about the objection in the first place. There would be many more examples, involving event catering, child discipline, traditional rites, or censorship, among other things.**
We may, however, imagine a different scenario. While the state continues to protect identities against abuse, as it generally does, where there is loss for reason of identity—which need not be synonymous with abuse—the state may develop a system of equality benefits. That is, in cases where there are penalties today, benefits may take their place, which are provided by the state. Thus losses would be offset by the state.***
The approach is a positive one, to help and enable those who could be disadvantaged by their identity. In theology (it is a theological problem, too), this may be reconciled with common grace—a grace which applies to all humankind, regardless of their identity, or what one may think of it. More than this, it affirms the value of diversity and mixing, and enriches the common experience. Perhaps such principles would help turn down the temperature.
* In some cases, identity may not serve the common good—alternatively, will do harm to all. Where this becomes apparent, the state will need to act in the interests of the greater good.
** One modern justice system (South Africa) puts it like this: No one, on the basis of identity, may 'impose burdens or withhold benefits or opportunities'. The proposal here is that the state alleviates burdens, or provides that which is withheld.
*** If one is faced with loss without warning, however, this may cross the line of discrimination. Identities need to be sufficiently transparent to prevent conflict by surprise.
The post states that "identity represents a kind of virtue ethics"… and then later on that "In some cases, identity may not serve the common good—alternatively, will do harm to all". Isn't there a contradiction here?
ReplyDeleteSurely the personal struggle for 'identity' recognition' emerges as a consequence of, or sometimes manifests the primary struggle of, first knowing who I am. Without consciousness, we cannot know identity. And without context, we cannot know identity because consciousness cannot happen in a vacuum, it requires a context. While I agreed that the issue of identity was not nearly as controversial or popular a hundred years ago as it is now, would you entertain that the issue of race has been raging for hundreds of years – and at the core of the issue of race we must surely see the matter of identity?
ReplyDeleteAlso – it occurs to me that if we talk identity, we have to think about change (think the Ship of Theseus, as reported by Plutarch with the changing deck planks) and the permanence and impermanence of identity. Locke (1632–1704) uses Theseus’ ship in luring his readers to consider the balance between the persistence and transience of identity. Surely it is only in persistent individuation that we can find personal identity – as it is in corporation or sameness that we find collective identity.
It was the philosophical Greeks who inspired their worlds with the quip, "Know thyself" encapsulating this struggle. The challenge is surely that we do not know ourselves right. And if we are skew on our self-knowledge, everything else is a little skewed.
The discussion of the permanence and transience of identity is perhaps more complex now than it has ever been. Consciousness (which cannot be separated from identity) has for many become fluid, even to the point of sexuality being about current manifestation – underscored by Eckhart Tolle’s focus on existential ‘nowness,’ or living in reality which is found exclusively in the ‘now’ moment. All else is either memory (past) or fantasy (future) – whereas the now moment is the only place we find reality – and the only place we can therefore experience and express identity.
The challenge with entrusting the state with the responsibility to protect identities from abuse, is that we may be asking the fox to guard the henhouse. I cannot help but wonder if the current pendulum swing of subjectification of identity is a natural reaction to social stratification at the expense of personal individuation - that must run its course before we can find the richness of holding onto both the individuation and collectivation of identity. Or is that a vain hope?
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